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The relationship between politics and economic policy has a long tradition in economic analysis. One important
approach links macroeconomic policy decisions to the electoral cycle and has become known in the literature as
the political business cycle theory. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) characterize the political
business cycle as the equilibrium of a signaling game that arises due to a temporary information asymmetry
between government and fully rational voters. Another important line of research that relates economic policy
decisions to the electoral cycle focuses on industry-level issues and treats the regulatory process as the arbitration
of conflicting social, economic, and political interests rather than a pure welfare-maximizing effort. This
approach originated from the early work of Stigler (1971) and was further developed in Peltzman (1976) with the
introduction of a formal model in which the regulated price was chosen so as to maximize political support for
the incumbent government-regulator. This paper combines the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and Rogoff and
Sibert (1988) to model the regulator’s problem as a signaling game where politicians set the regulated price
trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and
welfare constraints interact in the model yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry
falls in periods immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in
regulated industries, this paper also provides empirical support for this theory. Using quarterly data from 32
industrial and developing countries over the period  1978–2004, we find strong statistical and econometric
evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in gasoline markets.
Keywords: political cycle, regulated prices, gasoline prices.
JEL classification: K20, L51, E32.
Resumo
A relação entre política e economia tem uma longa tradição na analise econômica. Uma abordagem importante
relaciona as decisões de política macroeconômica ao ciclo eleitoral e ficou conhecido na literatura como a teoria
do ciclo político de negócios. Rogoff e Sibert (1988) e Rogoff (1990) caracterizam o ciclo político como o
equilíbrio de um jogo de sinalização que se origina da assimetria de informação temporária existente entre o
governo e eleitores racionais. Outra abordagem importante foca em questões intra-industria e trata o processo
regulatório como a arbitragem de interesses econômicos conflitantes ao invés da maximização pura do bem estar
social. Esta abordagem originou-se do trabalho pioneiro de Stigler (1971) e foi posteriormente desenvolvida por
Peltzman (1976) com a introdução de um modelo formal em que o preço regulado e escolhido para maximizar o
a apoio político do incumbente. Este trabalho combina as principais idéias de Peltzman  e Rogoff e Sibert  para
modelar o problema do regulador como um jogo de sinalização onde o político-regulador determina o preço
regulado para tentar sinalizar para os eleitores um comportamento pro-consumidor. Em equilíbrio, o preço real
de uma industria regulada cai em períodos que precedem uma eleição. Este artigo também apresenta evidencia
empírica desta teoria. Usando dados trimestrais de 32 paises industriais e em desenvolvimento no período 1978-
2004, nós achamos forte evidencia estatística mostrando a existência de ciclos eleitorais de preço em mercados
de gasolina.
Keywords: ciclo político, preços regulados, mercados de gasolina.
                                                
1 Ibmec São Paulo (moita@uiuc.edu)
2 IMF.I.   INTRODUCTION
The relationship between politics and economic policy has a long tradition in economic
analysis. One important approach links macroeconomic policy decisions to the electoral cycle
and has become known in the literature as the political business cycle theory. Pioneered by
Nordhaus (1975), this theory claims that macroeconomic aggregates—such as the money
supply and the government budget—are likely to follow a cycle driven by electoral interests,
as incumbent politicians distort economic policy to deceive myopic voters and obtain short-
term political gains. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) refine this approach by
characterizing the political business cycle as the equilibrium of a signaling game that arises
due to a temporary information asymmetry between government and fully rational voters.
Another important line of research that relates economic policy decisions to the electoral cycle
focuses on industry-level issues and treats the regulatory process as the arbitration of
conflicting social, economic, and political interests rather than a pure welfare-maximizing
effort. This approach originated from the early work of Stigler (1971) and was further
developed in Peltzman (1976) with the introduction of a formal model in which the regulated
price was chosen so as to maximize political support for the incumbent government-regulator.
This paper follows Paiva (1995) in combining elements of both approaches described above:
the idea that policy decisions may change with the proximity of elections is borrowed from
the political business cycle theory and added to enhance the traditional, static models of
political regulation. More specifically, we combine the main ideas of Peltzman (1976) and
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) to model the regulator’s problem as a signaling game where
politicians set the regulated price trying to maximize electoral support by signaling to voters a
pro-consumer behavior. Political incentives and welfare constraints interact in the model
yielding an equilibrium in which the real price in a regulated industry falls in periods
immediately preceding an election. Besides presenting a new model of political price cycles in
regulated industries, this paper also provides empirical support for this theory. Using quarterly
data from 32 industrial and developing countries over the period 1978–2004, we find strong
statistical and econometric evidence pointing toward the existence of electoral price cycles in
gasoline markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we broadly describe
the evolution of the ideas embedded in the theories of political business cycle and political
regulation that form the basis for our theory of electoral cycles in regulated industries. In the
third section we introduce our model of dynamic political regulation and derive the results
that characterize the political price cycle in regulated industries. Section 4 presents the
empirical evidence supporting the results of our model and Section 5 brings our concluding
remarks.
II.   BACKGROUND
In his ground-breaking work on political business cycle, Nordhaus (1975) predicts that
governments will inflate the economy in election years in order to exploit a Philips curve tradeoff that is beneficial in the short but not in the long run. His model assumes that consumers
have adaptive expectations about inflation and are myopic in the sense that they partially
forget, or heavily discount, the past. Regardless of their party affiliation, politicians turned
policy makers are assumed to be opportunistic and only care about being re-elected. The
model implies that (1) in an election year the government uses expansionary policies to
decrease unemployment; (2) concerns about inflation only arise after the election; and (3)
every government follows the same policy. A common criticism of this type of model is that
rational voters would understand the motivation for and the consequences of distorting the
optimal policy in election years, therefore making politicians less likely to adopt such
strategy.
However, Tufte (1978), among others, continued to provide empirical evidence of the
occurrence of political business cycles and new models were developed to explain the
phenomenon. Abandoning the old assumptions of adaptive expectations and myopic voters,
Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) rationalize the political business cycle as the
equilibrium of a signaling game originated from a temporary information asymmetry between
government and voters. Governments can be differentiated by their level of competency, with
more competent governments providing the same amount of services using less resources.
Government competency is modeled as a serially correlated stochastic variable that receives a
new shock every period. Information asymmetry arises from the fact that the government
learns its competency shock before voters do. In election years, the incumbent party has an
incentive to act as if it had received a high-competency shock, otherwise voters may prefer an
opposition party that can do better in the next period. In equilibrium, most governments will
lower non-distortionary taxes (collected before the elections) and increase distortionary taxes
(collected after the elections) in election years in order to signal their types. The least efficient
type of government is the only one who will not distort the taxation.
The pioneering work of Stigler (1971) claimed that industry regulation should be viewed as a
way to arbitrate among competing interests rather than a way to maximize welfare. Regulators
would make their decisions about price, market entry, and other relevant variables under
pressure from different interest groups. The regulatory outcome is therefore determined by
transactions between self-interested suppliers and demanders. The suppliers are the regulators
(with no distinction from the government) that sell wealth transfers in the form of regulated
prices and industry entry. The demanders are the interest groups, namely consumers and
firms, who bid to be favored in the wealth transfer process.
3 The equilibrium of Stigler’s
model is one in which, in the words of Peltzman (1993), “cohesive minorities tax diffuse
majorities,” and the process ends with the capture of the regulatory agency by the firms. This
conclusion refers to the fact that consumers have weak incentives to acquire information and
actively defend their interests in a particular industry since each individual regulatory decision
has only a limited impact on consumers’ utility. In contrast, producers have a strong enough
interest on the regulatory outcome in their industry so as to form pressure groups to influence
the political process.
                                                
3 The bids are not simple monetary transfers between the parts, but are composed of less tangible things such as
political favors, job offers in the future, votes, campaign contributions and so forth.Building on Stigler’s work, Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) developed models that
introduce a broader range of political influence of interest groups. In particular, Peltzman’s
model formalizes the idea that a regulatory agency chooses a price that maximizes political
support for the incumbent government-regulator. Political support depends on the profits of
the regulated firm(s) and on consumers’ surpluses. Given that profits (consumers’ surpluses)
increase (decrease) at a decreasing (increasing) rate, the regulated price that maximizes
political support will lie between the monopoly and the competitive price. This conclusion
differs from the previous work of Stigler in which the regulated price should be close to the
monopoly price, reflecting pure industry protection.
Paiva (1995) modifies Peltzman model by adding a time dimension to the regulator’s
maximization problem. The main idea is that regulator’s behavior changes with the proximity
of elections, securing higher profits and campaign donations from firms in non-election
periods and becoming more concerned with consumers’ interests in periods immediately
preceding elections. In line with Stigler’s view of diffused consumer interests, Paiva’s model
assumes that consumers do not keep track of past prices and that their voting decisions are
more affected by current prices and utility. In contrast, firms have a large stake in the
regulatory process and have (or acquire) perfect information about past prices. The
equilibrium of the model is one in which the solution to the intertemporal maximization
problem of the regulator yields lower prices in periods preceding the election, characterizing
an electoral cycle in regulated prices. One important weakness of this model is the reliance on
myopic consumer-voters or their heavy discounting of past regulatory decisions. We address
this problem by re-defining the regulator problem as a competency or preference-signaling
game while maintaining the two-period horizon, as shown in the following section.
III.   A MODEL OF POLITICAL PRICE CYCLE IN A REGULATED INDUSTRY
A.   General Description
We combine the main ideas of Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Peltzman (1976) and model the
government-regulator’s problem as a signaling game where the cycle is generated by
politicians trying to signal pro-consumer behavior to voters when setting the regulated price.
We deal with the discrete version of the problem where there are only two possible types of
government-regulator: pro-industry and pro-consumer. Contrary to the continuous case
developed in Rogoff and Sibert, here we are able to derive a closed-form solution to the model
in which regulators’ strategies may lead to a political cycle in the regulated price.
We model the problem of a government-regulator who sets prices in a regulated industry
seeking to maximize an intertemporal objective function which includes social welfare but
also the government’s chance of being reelected. The social welfare function in the regulated
market is a weighted average of consumers’ utility and industry profits in which the weights
follow a stochastic process. Elections take place every other period. In a non-electoral year the
incumbent government-regulator chooses the price that maximizes welfare in the regulated
market. In an election year, however, the incumbent may lower the regulated price to increase
its chance of being reelected. It is assumed that firms in the regulated industry cannot affectthe result of the election.
4 Consumers decide their votes influenced in part by the incumbent’s
pricing decision and in part by an exogenous shock to their utility function. This shock to
consumers’ utility could be related to the performance of the government in other areas, for
instance.
We model the government-regulator’s social welfare function as stochastic process in which
the relative weight of consumers’ utility and industry profits is determined by a shock
occurring at the beginning of every election period. In principle, a shock that determines a
higher (lower) weight on firms’ profits characterizes a pro-industry (pro-consumer) type of
regulator and results in the choice of a higher (lower) regulated price. For instance, a shock
that makes the incumbent more pro-industry could be thought of as resulting from (1) a
recently formed political coalition that attributes higher importance to securing future
investment in the sector; (2) external constraints that limit the country’s capacity to import the
regulated product, thus requiring an increase in domestic production and the profits to sustain
it; or (3) a negative fiscal shock elsewhere that would increase the need for extracting
additional income taxes from firms in the regulated industry.
The shock that determines whether the incumbent government-regulator is pro-consumer or
pro-industry is not observed by the voters until after the election.
5 This temporary information
asymmetry makes it possible for a pro-industry regulator to try and mimic the behavior of a
pro-consumer type by setting a lower price and increasing its chances of winning the
election.
6 However, since deviations from the welfare-maximizing price generate a decrease
in welfare at increasing rates, pro-consumer regulators can achieve a lower price than pro-
industry regulators for any given level of welfare. Therefore, in equilibrium, the pro-consumer
regulator will set a price unachievable by the pro-industry type in order to unequivocally
signal its type to consumer-voters. Unable to match this lower price, pro-industry regulators
have no reason to distort the regulated price in equilibrium.
The order of events is what drives the cycle. At the beginning of the period (t) the incumbent
receives its preference shock and sets the regulated price. Afterward, the election happens, the
winner is announced, and the period ends. At the beginning of the following period (t+1), the
winner of the election takes office until the end of the next period (t+2). Note that a new
preference shock will define a new orientation for the incumbent at the beginning of period
t+2, and another election will then take place. If reelected, the incumbent type is revealed to
                                                
4 This assumption rules out the possibility of raising the regulated price in exchange for campaign donations
from the industry. However, the regulator does not set the price equal to marginal cost (the most pro-consumer
price—see Peltzman, 1976) since the industry has a positive weight in the government-regulator’s social welfare
function.
5 The fact that consumers cannot observe the pro-consumer shock of the government can be justified by the fact
that the regulated price is one among several prices that matter to consumers, and gathering information about
the situation of the shock on profitability is too costly compared to the value of one vote.
6 With full information there would not be any distortion since the politician’s type would be public known, and
there would be no reason to signal anything.the public, since the regulator will set the post-election price that maximize its social welfare
function, with no electoral concerns.
B.   Formalizing the Model
The firm’s profit function is given by
) ( t t t q C q p − = π
Where π  is the profit of the firm, pt is the price of the regulated good, qt is the quantity
produced-demanded of the good and C(q) is the cost function, that we assume to be
continuous differentiable with Cq > 0 and Cqq > 0.
Consumers-voter’s utility function is given by,
I
t t t q q U η φ + = ) ( ) (
with  0 '> φ  and  0 ' ' < φ , and ηt is a random variable that represents the popularity of the
government and may be related to it’s performance in areas other than the regulated market. It
follows
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Where st is iid with a unimodal distribution, twice continuously differentiable with mean zero.
The superscripts I and O refer to incumbent and opposition parties. Given prices, they
maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint, what gives the demand function
) (p q q =  for the good.
The type of the politician is defined by α, where  {} α α α , ∈ , with α  being the more pro-
consumer type and α  being the more pro-industry type,  α α < .and Prob µ α α = = ) (.  T h e
value of α refers only to the incumbent, and the fact that the shock in time t will define the
type in periods t and t+1 is what drives the signaling problem of the incumbent; otherwise the
competency of a party today would be disconnected of the competency in the next period, and
would not have any influence in voters’ decision.
The incumbent has the following social welfare function,
)) ( ( ) 1 ( )) ( ( . ) ( α α α π α α p V p W − + =
Where V(p(α)) is the indirect utility of the consumer. However, the objective function of the
government is a finite horizon maximization problem, where he decides the regulated price in
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Where R is the probability of the incumbent being reelected and will be formalized below; σ is
the weight the party places on being elected relative to social welfare; and β < 1 is a discount
factor. The opposition party has a similar objective function.
The game has the following chronological order (Figure 1): At the beginning of the period the
government observes its own shock αt. Next, the regulatory process takes place and the
regulated price pt is set and observed by all agents. After the price is set, government and
consumers observe the popularity shock of the incumbent, st, and the election happens. In the
following period, t+1, the party that wins the elections takes office until t+2, when elections
will be held again.
Figure 1. Chronological Order of Events
It is important to notice that the government has an advantage over the public regarding access
to information, since it observes the shock α before the public does. Voters only observe αt at
the beginning of the next period, t+1, when the incumbent announces the new price. That is
what allows the government to try and mimic a different type to the public: incumbents with
higher α have an incentive to act as if they have a lower one.
The incumbent party win the elections in period t if
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The shock received in period t provides no information about the shock (and the price) in
period t+2 (the time of the next election), since a new shock happens in t+2. Therefore
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Where  p ˆ  is the mean value of p, and the expectation is taken conditional on the information
available to the public in time t.
The incumbent party does not observe st when it sets the price pt, hence the probability of
winning is given by,
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and it follows the probability distribution of s, and 
I O R R − =1 . A high value of the
popularity shock s increases the chances of winning the election, since it increases the voters’
utility. At the time the incumbent sets the price he cannot observe the popularity shock, so
there is no relation between the price and st. That is why the probability of winning the
election follows the distribution of the popularity shock.
C.   Sequential Equilibrium
To find the equilibrium of the model we rely on the fact that each election cycle is
independent of past election cycles. First, this is due to the fact that the shock in time t will not
have any influence in time t+2, and also because the information asymmetries are only
temporary. Second, there is no history dependence in this model, in the sense that reputational
aspects do not enter the problem.
We start assuming that in equilibrium voters recognize the incentive to lower prices in
election years and are able to make the mapping between α and the regulated price. So, voters’
beliefs about α as a function of p are given by,
() t t p p α ~ ~ =
The fact that we assume that beliefs about price depend only on the current shock implies that
incumbents decisions about price affect only the current period. It turns out that the otherwise
dynamic problem of the incumbent becomes a static maximization problem, where the
incumbent sets the regulated price that maximizes that year’s objective function. Hence, the
objective function of the incumbent in an election year reduces to,
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And in a non-electoral year t+1 it becomes,
) ( max
) ( 1 t p
I
t W α
α = Φ + .Since the objective function in a non-electoral year is the welfare function itself, in
equilibrium the incumbent set the regulated price to the level that maximizes the welfare
function in non-electoral years. Now we turn to the pricing problem in electoral years. We
dropped the subscript t for simplicity of notation keeping in mind that all the analysis that
follows refer to electoral years.
Before characterizing the equilibrium we need some new definitions. Define  ) , ( p W α  as the
value of the social welfare function when the politician choose price  p
and ) , ( max arg ) (
* p W p α α = . Also, define the difference in welfare when type α chooses p or
p’ as  ) ' , ( ) , ( ) ' ( p W p W p p α α λ − = − . Therefore, when type α chooses ) (α p ,
)) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( ) ( (
* * α α α α α α λ p W p W p p − = − gives a measure of the distortion that type α
creates from deviating from the welfare maximizing price ) (
* α p .
Now we characterize the separating equilibrium of this signaling game. In equilibrium the
incumbent politician adopts the following strategies: if pro-industry type he sets
) ( ) (
* α α p p =  and  0 )) ( ) ( (
* = − α α λ p p ; if pro-consumer type sets  ) ( ) (
* α α p p <  and
0 )) ( ) ( (
* > − α α λ p p . Any voters’ beliefs that assign probability one of being a high type
when observing  ) (α p , and probability one of being a low type when observing  ) (α p  is
consistent with this equilibrium. This is the well known result first derived by Spence (1973)
that the least favored type (with respect to voters) does not try to signal his type since in
equilibrium he will be recognized anyway.
Proposition: In a separating equilibrium  ) ( ) (
* α α p p =  and  0 )) ( ) ( (
* = − α α λ p p .
Proof: Suppose not. Instead,  ) ( ) (
* α α p p <  and  0 )) ( ) ( (
* > = − κ α α λ p p . There would be a
decreasing in welfare of κ . But since in equilibrium the high type α  would be recognized as
such, there would be no increase in the probability of being reelected. Therefore, the high type
is better off by setting  ) ( ) (
* α α p p =  and  0 )) ( ) ( (
* = − α α λ p p .  ■
Theorem: A separating sequential equilibrium of this game has
[] [] ] [ ] [ ) ( ) (
1 * α α σ λ α α R R p p − − =
− .
Proof: Sequential rationality of the game requires that no player finds it better off to deviate
from the equilibrium path. This implies the following conditions:
()() α α α α , , Φ ≥ Φ
()() α α α α , , Φ ≥ Φ
Where the first term within the parentheses is the true type of the incumbent, and the second
term is the one he is trying to mimic. The first inequality,  ()() α α α α , , Φ ≥ Φ , implies] [ )) ( , ( ] [ )) ( , ( α σ α α α σ α α R p W R p W + ≥ +
Rearranging terms we have
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Since in equilibrium  ) ( ) (
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* * α α α α α α λ p W p W p p − = − ,
substituting we have
[] ] [ ] [ )) ( ) ( (
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In any equilibrium of this game  ) ( ) (
* α α p p ≤ ,  and in this range  )) ( , ( α α p W  increases in
) (α p , up to  ) (
* α p . It implies that  )) ( ) ( (
* α α λ p p −  is a monotonic decreasing function of
prices  ) (α p ,  and therefore it has an inverse,  (.)
1 − λ .
7 Hence,
[] [] ] [ ] [ ) ( ) (
1 * α α σ λ α α R R p p − − ≥
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Using the same argument for the high type restriction, ()() α α α α , , Φ ≥ Φ , the following
condition can be derived:
[] [] ] [ ] [ ) ( ) (
1 * α α σ λ α α R R p p − − ≤
−
Since in equilibrium both conditions must hold, it implies that
[] [] ] [ ] [ ) ( ) (
1 * α α σ λ α α R R p p − − =
− .  ■
The distortion of the pro-consumer type is given by  )) ( ) ( (
* α α λ p p − >0. In equilibrium the
distortion of the lower type is a function of the difference between the probability of each type
winning the election, and on how the incumbent weight his objective function. The greater the
chance of the lower type winning the election compared to the higher type, the more the lower
type will distort to run away from the higher type. Also, the more weight the politician put on
being re-elected compared to the consumer welfare, the more he will distort.
It is worth noticing that without loss of generality we consider only the case where signaling
happens. No signaling happens when  ) ( ) ( ) (
* * α α α p p p < < , since the high type will not try
to mimic the low type anyway, and both types will set prices that maximize the social welfare.
                                                
7 λ(.) is increasing in prices for price levels exceeding the one that maximize the social welfare. It is not relevant
since in equilibrium no price will fall in that region.We proved here that, in equilibrium, some government-regulators (in our model, the pro-
consumer type) will distort and lower the regulated price to differentiate themselves from
other types of regulators (pro-industry). Hence, one empirical implication of our discrete, two-
type regulator model is that the political cycle in regulated industries only takes place when a
pro-consumer regulator is in office, what happens here with probability  ) 1 ( µ − . While our
model is sufficient to give the main insights justifying a political cycle in regulated prices, a
model allowing for a continuum of regulator types would be more realistic since it would
allow for cycles of different intensities. In the continuum of types case, everyone but the most
pro-industry type would lower the price before elections to differentiate themselves from the
type immediately below. Everything else constant, the probability distribution of the regulated
price would then follow the distribution of regulator types. Earlier models accounted for the
political nature of the regulatory process but could not rationalize a political cycle in the
regulated price. The model developed here results in such cycles even when rational voters are
able to understand the process and the strategy of the incumbent.
IV.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A.   The Market
Our model of political price cycles in regulated industries is tested for the gasoline market in
various countries. The choice of gasoline as a product whose price may be affected by the
electoral cycle is justified mainly by the fact that gasoline is a fairly homogeneous product
purchased regularly by a high number of people who are therefore likely to remember its
price. Moreover, gasoline prices are a major determinant of transportation costs, thus directly
and indirectly affecting inflation and consumer welfare.
8
Extensive media coverage of gasoline price fluctuations simultaneously attests the importance
of gasoline in people’s daily routines and increases the visibility of such fluctuations, thereby
raising the likelihood that an electorally concerned government-regulator may try to influence
them. For instance, an article recently published on the front page of the Washington Post
states that “rising fuel prices are stoking popular anger around the world, throwing politicians
on the defensive and forcing governments to resort to price freezes, tax cuts and other
measures to soothe voter resentment.”
9 This quote also illustrates another assumption we
make in using the gasoline market in the empirical part of our paper: that governments either
determine gasoline prices directly through price regulation or exert strong influence on them
through regulatory stocks, importation, taxes, and subsidies. Note that the model derived in
the previous section can be easily adapted to incorporate indirect price regulation strategies.
                                                
8 In addition, Paiva (1995) provides evidence of the occurrence of a political cycle in gasoline prices in Brazil.
9 “High Oil Prices Met With Anger Worldwide—Both Rich and Poor Countries Make Moves to Appease
Citizens,” by Paul Blustein and Craig Timberg, Washington Post, October 3, 2005.B.   The Data
The initial dataset comprised quarterly series on the evolution of domestic gasoline prices,
consumer price indexes, and exchange rates of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar
for 32 industrial and developing countries during the period 1978–2004.
 A list of the countries
covered can be found in the appendix. Countries were included in the sample based on data
availability. Because some countries did not have gasoline price or exchange rate data for
every quarter in the sample period, the maximum number of observations in the pool was
2,915. The dataset also included a series with average international oil prices expressed in
U.S. dollars as well as a dummy variable for each country in the sample indicating the
quarters in which elections for Parliament or Congress occurred.
10 Only Legislative elections
were considered here because every country in the sample had at least one election of this type
during the period analyzed. In contrast, Presidential elections either do not take place or are
less relevant in the many countries where a Parliamentary regime is in place
Domestic gasoline prices were obtained from the Energy Prices and Taxes database
published by the OECD. Consumer prices and exchange rates were taken from the
International Finance Statistics while international crude oil prices came from the Commodity
Price System Database, both compiled by the IMF. Election dates were found in the Election
Results Archive maintained by the Center on Democratic Performance at Binghamton
University (State University of New York).
Seeking some preliminary evidence of the occurrence of a political cycle in the real price of
gasoline, for each country in the sample we created a variable named gasprofit that measures
how much the real price of gasoline changes in comparison to the real change in the cost of oil
expressed in domestic currency. The idea is that while real gasoline prices can be expected to
vary broadly in line with international oil prices and the real exchange rate, a politically
motivated government or regulator would resist passing these higher production costs onto the
domestic gasoline price in the run-up to an important election. The variable gasprofit is thus
defined as:
gasprofit = [(1+ cpgas) ÷ (1+ cpoildomcur)] – 1} * 100
where cpgas is the percentage change in gasoline prices and cpoidomcur is the percentage
change in the international oil price expressed in domestic currency.
Interestingly, pooling all countries together and considering the full sample period 
1978–2004, the variable gasprofit increased at an average of 1.4 percent during “normal”
quarters and declined by 0.4 percent in periods with electoral activity.
11 Indicating that this
difference is not the result of a few outlier countries, the average change in gasprofit during
electoral quarters was lower than the average change in “normal” quarters in 25 of the
                                                
10 The international oil price used in this study was calculated as a simple average of three crude oil spot prices:
Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai Fateh.
11 Electoral activity is considered to take place in the election quarter and in the quarter immediately preceding
the election quarter.32 countries in the sample. Moreover, in the majority of the countries surveyed, the increase
in real gasoline prices fell short of the increase in oil costs expressed in real domestic currency
units during periods of electoral campaign: the average change in gasprofit during electoral
quarters was negative in 23 countries of our sample; in contrast, only in 7 countries that same
average was negative during quarters with no election activity.
Focusing on real gasoline prices alone, we observed that they declined 0.3 percent, on average,
during “normal” quarters and about 0.7 percent during quarters of electoral campaign; in
15 countries, this difference exceeded 2 percentage points, whereas in 7 countries it exceeded
6 percentage points.
C.   Econometric Modeling
Moving toward formal econometric modeling, the following variables were generated for each
country in the sample: lrgas was defined as the natural logarithm of domestic gasoline prices
minus the natural logarithm of domestic CPI; ldompoil is the natural logarithm of real oil
prices expressed in domestic currency; and lrer is the natural logarithm of the exchange rate
minus the natural logarithm of the domestic CPI. The series lpoilusd defined as the natural
logarithm of international oil prices in U.S. dollars is also used in some model specifications.
Unit root tests (available from the authors) were not conclusive regarding the stationarity of
the series in levels, as the different test statistics yielded conflicting results.
12 Nonetheless, all
tests indicated the first differences of the series to be stationary. Econometric estimations were
therefore carried out with the variables in first differences.
Our basic model simply relates the evolution of real gasoline prices in each country to the real
cost of oil expressed in domestic currency and the electoral calendar, thus having the
following general specification:
clrgasn,t =  Σi γi.cldompoiln,t-i + δ.Delecn,t  + αn + τt + εn,t (1)
where
clrgasn,t is the change in lrgas in country n at time t
cldompoilt-i is the change in ldompoil at time t-i
Delecn,t  is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if an election is to take place in country
n either in the current or in the next quarter and zero otherwise
αn are country specific effects (fixed or random)
τt are period specific effects (fixed or random)
εn,t  are residuals
                                                
12 We carried out stationarity tests that assume a common unit root process and others that assume individual unit
root processes; each category of test had three alternative statistics.0 < i < 4 is the number of lags of the explanatory variables entering different variations of the
basic model
and γi and δ are parameters to be estimated
Six variants of the basic model are summarized in Table 1 and show that the electoral dummy
coefficient estimates (δ) are always negative and highly significant, therefore pointing toward
the existence of a political cycle in gasoline markets. The model selection process started with
a specification that included only contemporaneous values of domestic oil costs and both
country and period specific effects (first column). However, F-tests on the significance of
these individual effects indicated the country specific effects to be redundant. A Hausman test
subsequently rejected the specification with random period effects (second column).
13 The
model estimated with fixed period effects thus emerged as our preferred specification (third
column). It indicates that suppliers and regulators generally chose to smooth out fluctuations
in fuel costs, passing onto domestic gasoline prices, on average, only about 16 percent of the
contemporaneous changes in the cost of oil expressed in domestic currency. More
importantly, the estimated coefficient δ suggests that regulators tend to lower real gasoline
prices by 0.9 percent during periods of election campaign, a relatively sharp decline compared
to the quarterly average reduction of 0.3 percent for the entire sample period.
                                                
13 Seasonal dummy variables were added to specifications with time random effects.Table 1. Real Gasoline Prices, Oil Costs, and Elections: Basic Model

































Country effects Fixed None None Fixed None None
Period effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed Random Fixed
Method LS GLS LS LS LS LS
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.05 0.31 0.32 0.10 0.32
No. of observations 2,937 2,937 2,937 2,913 2,913 2,913
Hausman statistic p-value 0.006 0.351
     ** (*) indicates significance at the 5-percent level (10-percent level).
     Number in parenthesis are t-ratios.
Model specifications that include lagged oil costs among the explanatory variables are
summarized in the last three columns of Table 1. Up to 4 lags of the cost of oil were added to
the model (i < 4), but only the first lag reached minimum significance levels and improved the
regression fit as measured by the adjusted R-squared. We started once again from a broad
specification with both country and period fixed effects (column 4), but F-tests confirmed that
the country fixed effects remain redundant in the new specification. Hausman test no longer
rejects the specification with random period effects (column 5), although the model with
period fixed effects still yields the highest adjusted R-squared (column 6). The electoral
dummy variable remains highly significant in all specifications, suggesting that real gasoline
prices are reduced by about 0.9 or 0.8 percent during quarters of electoral activity.
In order to further assess the robustness of our results, we re-estimated regressions similar to
the ones above but allowing the coefficients on the current and lagged values of domestic oil
costs to be different for each country in the sample.
14 The results are summarized in Table 2
and generally portrait electoral dummy coefficients that are even more significant than in the
previous specifications. Moreover, the country-specific coefficients on current and lagged oil
costs are strongly significant in almost every case, thus improving the fit of the regressions.
                                                
14 Instead of a single coefficient for each lag of the explanatory variable we would have γi,n  with n = 1, 2, ..., 32.Table 2. Real Gasoline Prices, Oil Costs, and Elections: Modified Basic Model
1 2 3 4 5 6
cldompoilt
(country-specific)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
cldompoilt-1
(country-specific)













Country effects Fixed None None Fixed None None
Period effects Fixed Random Fixed Fixed Fixed Random
Method LS GLS LS LS LS GLS
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.13 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.23
No. of observations 2,937 2,937 2,937 2,913 2,913 2,913
Hausman statistic p-value 0.556 0.112
   ** (*) indicates significance at the 5-percent level (10-percent level).
As another test for the robustness of the main results to different model specifications, we also
estimate a model in which international oil prices in U.S. dollars and the real exchange rate
enter the real gasoline price equation separately, as follows:
15
clrgasn,t =  Σi λi.clpoilusdt-i + Σi µi.clrern,t-i + δ.Delecn,t  + αn + τt + εn,t  (2)
where
clpoilusdt-i is the change in lpoilusd at time t-i
clrern,t-i  is the change in lrer in country n at time t-i
0 < i < 4 is the number of lags of the explanatory variables entering different variations of the
model
and λi , µi , and δ are parameters to be estimated.
Variations of the model given in (2) were estimated with common and country-specific
coefficients λi and µi and the results are summarized in Table 3.
                                                
15 Introducing these costs factors as separate explanatory variables allows for the possibility that regulators react
differently to cost increases (reductions) stemming from weaker (stronger) domestic currency or higher (lower)
international oil prices.Table 3. Real Gasoline Prices, Oil Costs, and Elections: Alternative Model
1 2 3 4 5 6




























Country effects Fixed None Fixed Fixed None Fixed
Period effects Random Random None None Random None
Method GLS GLS LS LS GLS LS
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.25 0.16 0.20 0.35
No. of observations 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,913 2,913
** (*) indicates significance at the 5-percent level (10-percent level).
Once again, only the first lag of explanatory variables reached minimum significance levels.
Because international oil prices in U.S. dollars are the same for every country in the sample,
equation (2) cannot be estimated with period fixed effects, as these would introduce perfect
colinearity among regressors. Notice that the electoral dummy variable remains highly
significant in the various specifications, in the presence of fixed and/or random individual
effects, and whether common or country-specific coefficients are estimated for the
explanatory variables. The point estimates suggest that the real price of gasoline declines by at
least 0.7 percent and up to 1 percent, on average, during quarters of election campaign in the
32 countries covered by our sample.
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper presented a model of industry regulation where information asymmetries and the
government-regulator’s interest in being re-elected may generate a political cycle in the
regulated price. Quarterly data covering 32 countries during the period 1978–2004 provided
strong evidence of the occurrence of a political cycle in gasoline prices.
Our model characterizes the behavior of the government-regulator as an attempt to maximize
an objective function comprised of the social welfare in the regulated market and thegovernment’s chance of being reelected. The social welfare function follows a stochastic
process in which the weights attributed to consumers’ utility and firms’ profits are determined
by a shock at the beginning of an election period. This shock may reflect changing political
alliances or economic conditions exogenous to the regulated market. Because this shock is not
immediately observable to consumer-voters, the incumbent government-regulator may have
incentives to set a price below the welfare-maximizing price to signal its pro-consumer nature
and thus attract more votes in the upcoming election. In fact, our model derives equilibrium
regulation strategies in which some types of government-regulator will lower the regulated
price in an election period, thus generating a political price cycle in the regulated industry.
We tested the implications of our model for the gasoline market in the 32 industrial and
developing countries for which data was available. The choice of the gasoline market is
justified by the impact it has on consumers’ utility, the visibility that fluctuations in gasoline
prices have, and the various ways—besides direct price determination—through which
governments can influence domestic gasoline prices. Simple statistical analysis revealed that
changes in gasoline prices were, on average, 1.4 percent above changes in domestic oil costs
during “normal” quarters and 0.4 percent below during periods immediately preceding an
election. Focusing on real gasoline prices alone, we observed that they declined 0.3 percent,
on average, during “normal” quarters and about 0.7 percent during quarters of electoral
campaign. Moreover, in 15 countries of the sample, this difference exceeded 2 percentage
points in 15 countries of our sample, whereas it exceeded 6 percentage points in seven
countries.
Econometric modeling also point toward the existence of a political cycle in gasoline prices.
Simple equations linking gasoline prices to changes in the cost of oil to domestic gasoline
producers (which is assumed to be driven by international oil prices and the exchange rate)
and dummy variables indicating periods of electoral activity were estimated using panel data
techniques. Our estimates consistently yielded negative and significant coefficients on the
electoral dummy variable, suggesting that after controlling for cost changes, gasoline prices
are reduced during periods of electoral activity. In fact, point estimates suggest that the real
price of gasoline declines by at least 0.7 percent and up to 1 percent, on average, during
quarters of election campaign in the 32 countries covered by our sample, a relatively sharp
decline compared to the average reduction of 0.3 percent in the entire sample period. These
results were robust across various model specifications.REFERENCES
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